A payoff allocation in a bargaining problem is midpoint dominant if each player obtains at least one n-th of her ideal payoff. The egalitarian solution of a bargaining problem may select a payoff configuration which is not midpoint dominant. We propose and characterize the solution which selects for each bargaining problem the feasible allocation that is closest to the egalitarian allocation, subject to being midpoint dominant. Our main axiom, midpoint monotonicity, is new to the literature; it imposes the standard monotonicity requirement whenever doing so does not result in selecting an allocation which is not midpoint dominant. In order to prove our main result we develop a general extension theorem for bargaining solutions that are order-preserving with respect to any order on the set of bargaining problems.
Introduction
In a bargaining problem n players have to agree on a feasible utility allocation: if they can't reach an agreement, they will receive zero payoffs. A bargaining solution is a map that selects a unique feasible payoff vector for every bargaining problem-as an arbitrator would do (Luce and Raiffa, 1957) .
One of the simplest options this arbitrator has is to determine a "dictator" by flipping a fair coin: the selected player will receive her maximum possible payoff, while any other player receives zero. The requirement that a bargaining solution Pareto-dominate this simple procedure has been formalized by Sobel (1981) as the midpoint domination axiom. It is satisfied by the solutions of Nash (1950) and Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) (see for instance Moulin, 1983; Rachmilevitch, 2014, respectively) ; but it is violated by the monotonic solutions of Kalai (1977) . Even worse, we show that the only solution that is monotonic and midpoint dominant is the procedure above-which, in general, is not Pareto efficient.
We propose a variant of the egalitarian-that is, monotonic and symmetricsolution that is designed to overcome this problem: the midpoint-constrained egalitarian solution, which selects for every problem, among the points that are (coordinate wise) greater than or equal to the midpoint, the one which is closest to the egalitarian point. We characterize this solution by four axioms: weak Pareto efficiency, symmetry, midpoint domination, and midpoint monotonicity. The first three are well-known in the bargaining literature; the fourth is novel, and the requirement it imposes is as follows: when the set of feasible utility vectors expands, the only justification to lower any player's payoff is that this is necessary for avoiding a violation of midpoint domination. In other words, all players should benefit from the addition of alternatives, unless this would imply a violation of midpoint domination.
Technically, we proceed in two steps. First, we characterize our solution on the class B * of problems in which the weak and strong Pareto frontiers coincide. We then prove an extension theorem for bargaining solutions: A bargaining solution is weakly monotonic if it is order-preserving with respect to some (arbitrary) order on the set of bargaining problems. Our theorem states that a bargaining solution that is continuous and weakly monotonic is already uniquely determined by its values on
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces some notation and standard axioms. Section 3 starts by characterizing the unique solution that satisfies monotonicity and midpoint domination, which is not Pareto efficient. This negative result motivates our midpoint monotonicity axiom that we propose at the end of that section. We present and analyze our new solution in Section 4. The extension theorem and its application are in Section 5. Section 6 contains a brief discussion.
Preliminaries

Notation
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a finite set of players. LetB be the collections of pairs (S, d) such that d ∈ S and S ⊆ R n is compact, convex, and d-comprehensive. The best that player i can hope for in (
) and always lies in S for S is convex.
A bargaining solution with domain B ⊆B is a map F that assigns to each pair
Normally, a bargaining solution is defined on a subset
1 For x, y ∈ R n we write x y if x i > y i for all i ∈ N , we write x ≥ y if x i ≥ y i for all i ∈ N , and x > y if x ≥ y and x = y. 2 S is d-comprehensive if x ∈ S for any x with d ≤ x ≤ s for some s ∈ S.
of B rather thanB. For reasons that will become clear later, it is beneficial to allow F to operate on this larger set.
Throughout the paper we assume that bargaining solutions are translation invariant, that is for any t ∈ R n it holds that F (S + t, d + t) = F (S, d) + t. In this case one can assume without loss of generality that
for all bargaining problems (S, d). In order to keep notation simple we will write S for the problem (S, 0).
Let S be a problem. A point s ∈ S is weakly Pareto optimal if there is no t ∈ S with t s, and strongly Pareto optimal if there is no t ∈ S with t > s. Let WPO (S) and PO(S) denote the weak and, respectively, strong Pareto frontiers of S, that is the set of weak and, respectively, strong Pareto optimal points in S. Denote by B * the collection of bargaining problems S with WPO(S) = PO(S). In the following we shall formulate axioms for solutions on subsets ofB, bearing in mind that not all elements of the respective domain are bargaining problems. We 3 The Hausdorff distance between two subsets X, Y of a metric space with metric d is defined as
The Closure of B
do so for technical reasons that will become clear later. However, the skeptical reader should rest assured that we do not impose our axioms anywhere outside B.
Standard Axioms
For a permutation π : N → N let π(S) = s π(i) i∈N : s ∈ S . A problem is called symmetric if π(S) = S for any permutation π. We start with three simple axioms a bargaining solution may satisfy.
Weak Pareto efficiency. A bargaining solution F is weakly Pareto efficient on B ⊆ B if F (S) is weakly Pareto optimal in S for each bargaining problem S ∈ B .
for all symmetric bargaining problems S ∈ B .
These three axioms are well known and have been discussed extensively in the bargaining literature (for instance in Peters, 1992) , so we will keep this section short and emphasize only one point: continuity is typically only defined for sequences whose limit lies in B, that is on B rather than onB. Requiring that it holds for all converging sequences-in particular those with limit inB \ B-is a stronger requirement, which we will discuss in Subsection 5.1.
3 Monotonicity and midpoint domination 3.1 Axioms Kalai (1977) introduced a very appealing notion of "fair" surplus division, by requiring that each player's share increase as the cake increases. More formally, he introduced the following axiom.
Monotonicity. A bargaining solution is monotonic on B ⊆B if F (S) ≤ F (T ) for
any two bargaining problems S, T ∈ B with S ⊆ T .
The most prominent monotonic solution is the egalitarian solution, E, that maps each problem S to the weakly Pareto optimal point E(S) ∈ S with E i (S) = E j (S) for all i, j ∈ N . Hence, the arbitrator assigns the same (highest possible) payoff to all players.
Another very simple (although maybe not very convincing) way to arbitrate a problem S is to randomly pick a player i and allocate to her a i (S), whereas the remaining players obtain 0. If each player is picked with equal probability, that is 1 n , then player i's expected payoff is m i (S). Sobel (1981) introduced the view that a solution should be at least as favorable as this random assignment; formally, he introduced the following axiom.
There are well known bargaining solutions that satisfy this axiom, for instance those of Nash (1950) and Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) .
5,6
A Characterization and a Negative Result
Midpoint domination alone is sufficient to characterize a bargaining solution on hyperplane problems, i.e. bargaining problems of the form H = cch {a i e i } i∈N for some vector a ∈ R n . 7,8 For these problems do not contain any point that weakly dominates their midpoint, one has F (H) = m(H). We use this observation to show 5 The Nash solution maps any problem S to the unique maximizer of i∈N x i in S. 6 The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution maps any problem S to the intersection between WPO(S) and the line from 0 to a(S).
7 By e i we denote the i-th unit vector; that is e i i = 1 and e i j = 0 for all i ∈ N and all j = i. 8 For a set X we denote by cch(X) the comprehensive convex hull of X, that is the smallest convex and comprehensive superset of X.
that midpoint domination and monotonicity together uniquely define one bargaining solution.
Proposition 3.1. Let B be a set of bargaining problems that contains all hyperplane problems. A bargaining solution F satisfies monotonicity and midpoint domination on B if and only if F (S) = m(S) for all S ∈ B .
Proof. Let S be a problem, let i ∈ N , and for ε > 0 define S ε i as a hyperplane problem with S ⊆ S ε i and a i (S ε i ) = a i (S) + ε. (Since S is compact and comprehensive such a problem always exists.) Then
where the inequality comes from F 's monotonicity. Since this is true for all i ∈ N and all ε > 0,
Unfortunately, the solution in Proposition 3.1 violates weak Pareto efficiency; so, this result should be interpreted as a negative one: there is no bargaining solution that satisfies weak Pareto efficiency, monotonicity, and midpoint domination.
Reconciliation: Midpoint Monotonicity
Our aim is to reconcile monotonicity and midpoint domination at least "in spirit": we keep midpoint domination, but we shall weaken monotonicity as much as necessary for the axioms not to conflict with weak Pareto efficiency. This leads to the following axiom.
Midpoint Monotonicity. A bargaining solution F is midpoint monotonic on B ⊆ B if F (S) ≤ F (T ) for any two problems S, T ∈ B for which S ⊆ T and there is t ∈ T with t ≥ m(T ) and t ≥ F (S).
In words, this axiom imposes monotonicity only if doing so causes no violation of midpoint domination. The following easy lemma is mainly stated for later reference.
Nevertheless, it illustrates important cases in which this axiom has bite. Lemma 3.2. Let F satisfy midpoint monotonicity, and let S, T be bargaining problems
Proof. Let t = F (S). Since t ∈ T , t ≥ m(T ), and t ≥ F (S), midpoint monotonicity applies, so F (T ) ≥ F (S).
The Midpoint-Constrained Egalitarian Solution
Combining midpoint domination and midpoint monotonicity intuitively translates to finding a solution that satisfies midpoint domination and is, in some sense, as "close as possible" to a monotonic solution. Taking this aim literally, we define the solution E * as the solution of the minimization problem
where . denotes the Euclidean norm. The constraints s ∈ S and s ≥ m(S) define a convex and compact feasibility set for any S ∈B.
9 As the objective function in (1) is continuous, this optimization problem always has a solution. Moreover, the objective function is strictly quasi-convex. For if s = t are such that s − E(S) = t − E(S) then αs + (1 − α) t − E(S) < s − E(S) for all α ∈ (0, 1). Hence, the solution of (1) is unique, which means that E * (S) is well-defined. We call this solution the midpoint-constrained egalitarian solution. Our main result is that E * satisfies our axioms-and no other bargaining solution does. We postpone the proof of Theorem 4.1 to the end of Section 5.3. We shall first present an algorithm to compute E * , from which we can derive an alternative, more useful, representation of this bargaining solution. We will use the latter in order to prove that E * satisfies our axioms.
Alternative representations of E *
Defining E * as the solution of a convex optimization problem is in line with our motivation to reconcile midpoint domination and (some form of) monotonicity. Nevertheless, in order to actually find E * (S) there are better ways. A simple procedure is the following: assign
and stop. Otherwise allocate to each i ∈ N with E i (S) < m i (S) the value m i (S), and allocate to all other players the (equal) payoff r that is maximally feasible. Again, if the new allocation satisfies midpoint domination, stop; otherwise repeat the previous step. Clearly this procedure stops eventually (after no more than n steps). Our first lemma formalizes this algorithm and shows that the resulting allocation is, in fact,
Then, there is t * ≤ n such that
Proof. The algorithm will stop after at most n steps as in each non-terminal step J t increases by at least one player. So, F t * (S) is well defined. Let F = F t * (S) and assume that F (S) = E * (S) for some S; that is, F does not solve (1). Let ε = E * (S) − F (S) ∈ R n , and observe that for all j ∈ J t *
Hence, ε j ≥ 0 for all j ∈ J t * so that i∈N \J t * ε i ≤ 0. Let r = F i (S) for i ∈ N \ J t * (which is equal for all such i). By construction r−E i (S) ≤ 0, so the strict convexity of the square function implies i∈N \J t * (S) (r
Hence,
where the last inequality is true as F does not solve (1). But this is impossible.
A second, very convenient, representation can now be obtained as an immediate corollary. (The proof is omitted.) Corollary 4.3. Let S ∈ B. Then E * (S) satisfies.
where r = r(S) is maximal subject to E * (S) ∈ S.
In the sequel we will refer to the number r in Equation (2) as r(S). Hence, E * i (S) = max {m i (S), r(S)} for all i ∈ N . From here let R(S) = {i ∈ N : E * i (S) = r(S)} and note that R(S) = ∅ for all S ∈ B.
Kalai (1977) related his monotonic solution to the social welfare function of Rawls (1971) , which maximizes the welfare of the least well off member of society. We can establish a similar connection between the latter and E * . 
If S ∈ B
* then arg max s∈S:s≥m(S) min i∈N s i = {E * (S)}.
Proof. Let S be a problem, let x = E * (S) and assume by contradiction that there exists a y ∈ S that satisfies y ≥ m(S) and min i∈N y i > min i∈N x i . Then y j ≥ min i∈N y i > min i∈N x i = r(S) for all j ∈ N , contradicting the optimality of r(S)
in Equation (2). By construction any s ∈ arg max s∈S:s≥m(S) min i∈N s i must satisfy s ≥ E * (S). Hence, if S ∈ B * this set has a unique element, namely E * (S).
Satisfied Axioms
We start this section by proving that E * satisfies the properties in Theorem 4.1.
Lemma 4.5. E * satisfies weak Pareto efficiency, symmetry, midpoint domination, and midpoint monotonicity on B.
Proof. For symmetric problems, one has E * (S) = E(S), which is symmetric. Weak
Pareto efficiency is clear from Corollary 4.3, and midpoint domination follows from the constraint in (1). We show midpoint monotonicity. Let S, T ∈ B be such that S ⊆ T and such that there is t ∈ T with t ≥ m(T ) and t ≥ E * (S). Then t i ≥ max{m i (T ), r(S)} for all i ∈ N . Let t * be the minimal such point. Note that if r(S) > r(T ) then t * i = r(S) > r(T ) for all i ∈ R(T ), contradicting the maximality of r(T ). So, r(T ) ≥ r(S). Hence, E *
We shall now turn to continuity, in particular continuity onB. For this purpose note that the egalitarian solution is well defined on problems S ∈B \ B, namely by E(S) = 0. Thus, the optimization problem (1) has a unique solution on S as well, namely m(S), and E * is well defined onB with E * (S) = m(S) for all S ∈B \ B. Assume that s = E * (S). Then there is t ∈ S with t ≥ m(S) and t − E (S) < s − E (S) . Define a sequence (t p ) p∈N with t p ≥ m (S p ) for all p ∈ N, such that there is a converging subsequence (t p ) ∈N with t p → t. Then
In particular, for sufficiently large , one has
tradicting the definition of s p as the solution of the minimization problem (1).
Characterization on B *
In this subsection we shall prove that the characterization of Theorem 4.1 holds on B * . For the proof the following notation is needed: for θ, x ∈ R n 0 let θ •x = (θ i x i ) i∈N . For a bargaining problem S let θ • S = {θ • s : s ∈ S}, that is θ • S is a positive linear transformation of S that keeps the origin fixed. Proof. By Lemma 4.5 it is sufficient to show that E * is the only bargaining solution with these properties. So let F be a solution that satisfies all four axioms. For a problem S ∈ B * let J(S) = J t * (S) be as in Lemma 4.2, and note that J(S)∪R(S) = N and J(S) ∩ R(S) = ∅. We proceed via induction over |J(S)|, so suppose first that
where the inequality is due to S ∈ B * . Let
Then T ⊆ S, T ∈ B * , and F (T ) = E * (S) by symmetry and weak Pareto efficiency.
is strongly Pareto efficient (recall that S ∈ B * ), we have F (S) = E * (S).
Let now |J(S)| ≥ 1 and suppose the claim is true for all S with |J(S )| ≤ |J(S)|− 1. Suppose without loss of generality that J(S) = {1, . . . , k}, and that k ∈ I t * (S) (that is, k is added to J(S) in the last non-trivial step of the algorithm). Let θ ∈ R n be defined by
and θ j = 1 for all j = k. Let S = θ • S and note that S ⊆ S as θ k < 1, and that S ∈ B * . Let
show that E * (S ) = x: let z be the unique solution of (1) 
z ≥ x, and the strong Pareto optimality of x requires z = x.
We now have R (S ) = R (S) ∪ {k}, that is J (S ) = J (S) \ {k}. Hence, by the induction hypothesis, F (S ) = E * (S ) ≥ m(S). By Lemma 3.2 midpoint monotonicity applies, so
and strong Pareto optimality of the latter completes the proof.
An Extension Theorem
Let F be a bargaining solution with domain B , and let B ⊆ B ⊆B. A bargaining solutionF : B → R n is an extension of F to B ifF (S) = F (S) for all S ∈ B . It is easy to see that the egalitarian solution has a unique extension from B * to B: For any S ∈ B \ B * can be approximated both from above and from below by arbitrarily close elements of B * , say S and S , so that E (S ) ≤ F (S) ≤ E (S ) for any monotonic F .
In what follows we provide an extension theorem that formalizes and generalizes the above intuitive example; in particular, the theorem allows us to uniquely extend E * from B * to B without imposing continuity. Spikes, 1981) . We obtain a similar result for (weakly) monotonic extensions of (weakly) monotonic Cauchy regular maps in the next section, where we will precisely define what we mean by weakly monotonic. Bearing in mind that E * is a continuous map on the complete metric space B , d H , and therefore Cauchy regular, allows us then to uniquely extend E * from B * to B.
Cauchy Regularity
Partially Ordered Metric Spaces
A partially ordered metric space is a triple (X, , d) such that (X, d) is a metric space, and is a partial order on X. Let (X, , d) and (Y, , d ) be two partially ordered
x, x ∈ X with x x . Proof. As B , d H is a complete metric space, F is Cauchy regular by Lemma 5.1.
Hence,Ḡ is an order-preserving extension of an order-preserving and Cauchy-regular map from B * to B. As B * is a dense subset of B and each element can be approximated from above and from below by a sequence in B * , Lemma 5.2 applies and there is a unique weakly monotonic extension. As F is a weakly monotonic extension,Ḡ and
In order to complete the proof of Theorem 4.1 it is now sufficient to show that E * is weakly monotonic and that each problem in B can be approximated from below and from above by sequences in B * . For this purpose define the partial order as
S T if and only if
S ⊆ T, and there is t ∈ T with
Proof of Theorem 4.1. E * is order-preserving with respect to , and Cauchy regular by Lemmas 4.6 and 5.1.
We first show that an approximation from below (in the sense of Theorem 5.3)
exists, so let S ∈ B \ B * . Let S 0 = cch ({a i (S)e i } i∈N ). Define recursively for each s ∈ WPO(S) and each integer p ≥ 0 the point t p (s) as the intersection of the line from 0 to s with WPO (S p ). Let
and let S p+1 = cch (f p+1 (WPO(S))). Clearly, S p ⊆ S p+1 for all p ≥ 0, and S p → S.
Hence, for each ε > 0 there is We next prove that S can be approximated from above. First note that m(S) / ∈ WPO(S) as S / ∈ B * . Let M (S) = {i ∈ N : E * i (S) > m i (S)} ⊆ R(S). Then M (S) = ∅ as E * is weakly Pareto efficient. Let ε > 0 and assume without loss of generality that ε ≤ n · min i∈M (S) (E * i (S) − m i (S)). Define S ε = cch S ∪ {(a i (S) + ε) e i } i∈M (S) .
Then, by construction, m (S ε ) ≤ E * (S). Hence S S ε . Moreover, d H (S, S ε ) ≤ ε.
So, all premises of Theorem 5.3 are satisfied, that is E * is the unique bargaining solution that satisfies weak Pareto efficiency, symmetry, midpoint domination, and midpoint monotonicity on B.
Discussion
The strength of Theorem 5.3 lies in the fact that a continuity axiom is not needed:
if a continuous and weakly monotonic extension is known then it must be unique. A word of caution is appropriate though: The extensionḠ is unique only on B, but not onB, for elements ofB \ B cannot be approximated from below by elements of B * .
As a simple example letḠ be such thatḠ (S) = 0 for all S ∈B \ B. This is another monotonic extension of E * from B * toB.
The axioms we have used in the characterization are independent: The solution F (S) = m(S) satisfies all axioms but Pareto efficiency, the egalitarian solution satisfies all axioms but midpoint domination, and the Nash solution satisfies all axioms but midpoint monotonicity. Efficiency, midpoint domination, and midpoint monotonicity are satisfied by the solution F q with F q i (S) = max {m i (S), t(S)q i } for all
